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Abstract 
Which types of political ads are most likely to draw criticism from fact-checkers?  Are fact-
checkers consistent in their evaluations of political ads?  Examining general election 
television ads from the 2008 U.S. presidential race, and based upon the evaluations of 
FactCheck.org, PolitiFact.com, and the Washington Post’s Fact Checker, this study 
demonstrates it was the attack ads from candidates that were most likely to draw scrutiny 
from the fact-checkers.  Most importantly, a high level of agreement between the fact-
checkers indicates their success at selecting political claims that can be consistently 
evaluated.  While political advertisers are increasingly using evidence to support their 
claims, what may be more critical in drawing evaluations from fact-checkers is the 
verifiability of a claim.  The implications of consistent fact-checking on the public, political 
actors, journalism and democracy are discussed.  With the revelation that fact-checking can 
be consistently practiced, localized efforts at fact-checking need encouragement, 
particularly as political TV ads increasingly drown out other potential sources of 
information for the public and increasingly are used in downballot races, local initiatives, 
referendums and judicial races. 
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Checking the Fact-checkers in 2008:  Predicting Political Ad Scrutiny and  
Assessing Consistency 
Over the last 20 years, the political fact-checking movement has grown to an 
unprecedented level.  By 2012, fact-checking was an enterprise capturing the attention of 
national magazines and newspapers.  Time magazine devoted its October 3rd cover story to an in-
depth exploration of the fact-checking movement (Scherer 2012).  The New York Times and USA 
Today not only offered fact-checks of their own, but also devoted reporting resources to cover 
fact-checking itself (Baker and Cooper 2012; Moore 2012).  Not all the attention was positive, 
however, and some even pushed back against the notion of fact-checking.  Most notable was a 
claim by a pollster for Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney.  Neil Newhouse 
infamously declared, “…we’re not going to let our campaign be dictated by fact-checkers” 
(Sargent 2012).  Many critics of fact-checking are concerned about its effectiveness and its 
consistency (Amazeen 2013).  Despite these criticisms, it is expected that fact-checking will 
continue to proliferate.  Thus, the present study offers political marketers and journalists a 
systematic analysis of the types of political ads that were most likely to draw scrutiny and the 
consistency of fact-checkers in evaluating ads from the 2008 presidential election. 
Amid skyrocketing campaign expenditures, television advertising persists in dominating 
political campaigns (Nichols and McChesney 2013; Stelter 2013).  As a proportion of the Gross 
Domestic Product the U.S. continues to spend increasingly more money on political campaigning 
(Amazeen 2012b).  In 2012, $2.6 billion was spent on the presidential campaign, up from $1.8 
billion in 2008 (Center for Responsive Politics 2009; Choma 2012).  Over 1.4 million ads aired 
during the 2012 presidential general election (Baum 2012; Fowler and Ridout 2012).  Kantar 
Media estimated that $1.1 billion was spent on local television ads and another $200 million on 
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local cable (Delo 2012).  Despite all of the ad spending, however, polling data suggest most 
people do not find political advertising informative or helpful.  Furthermore, one-third of 
respondents felt they could “hardly ever” trust what political candidates said in their ads while 
just over half (55%) felt they could only “some of the time” (CBS News 2007).  The public’s 
skepticism is warranted.  Multiple studies show that millions of voters have been bamboozled by 
inaccuracies in political ads (Jamieson and Jackson 2008; Winneg, Kenski and Jamieson 2005).  
Thus, despite its proliferation and pervasiveness, political advertising is often inaccurate and not 
credible.   Fact-checking has been an effort to address this issue. 
The aim of this article is to build upon theoretical and empirical understandings of 
political fact-checking.  The first section establishes the conditions under which ads are likely to 
receive scrutiny from fact-checkers and the basis upon which fact-checking can arbitrate the 
veracity of political claims.  These theoretical understandings support a series of hypotheses that 
are tested in the study reported here.  The empirical section of the article describes the first 
known content analysis to date establishing the level of agreement among the three leading 
political fact-checking organizations.  The primary data comprise ads from the 2008 U.S. 
presidential election and the accuracy evaluations of FactCheck.org, PolitiFact.com and the 
Washington Post’s Fact Checker.  The results indicate that it was the attack ads from candidates 
(rather than promotional ads or ads from independent interest groups) that were most likely to 
draw scrutiny from the fact-checkers in 2008.  Furthermore, the study found a high level of 
agreement among the fact-checkers, indicating their success at selecting political claims that can 
be consistently evaluated.  The article closes with a discussion of these findings, including their 
limitations, and with suggestions for future research. 
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Arbitrating Political Facts 
The enterprise of fact-checking was born out of concern that traditional journalism was 
no longer able or willing to hold political actors accountable for the veracity of their claims.  
Efforts at modern fact-checking originated during the early 1980s when attempts were made to 
check the accuracy of claims made by President Ronald Reagan.1  These efforts were abandoned 
soon after they started (Dobbs 2012).  Scrutiny of political advertising in particular rose in 
prominence during the 1992 presidential election (Cappella and Jamieson 1994; Just, Crigler, 
Alger, Cook, Kern and West 1996; Pfau and Louden 1994).  Prompted by the notoriously 
deceptive attack ads from the 1988 presidential campaign, political adwatches were implemented 
by both broadcast and print reporters to police the ads for accuracy and fairness (Cappella and 
Jamieson 1994). Generally, political ad watches have been found to focus largely on attack ads, 
portray advertisements negatively, and confer prominence and legitimation on political 
advertising (Jamieson 1992; Kaid et al. 1996; Jamieson et al. 2000).  The competitiveness of a 
race tends to be a key indicator in the prevalence of adwatching with the most contentious races 
generating more adwatches (Fowler and Ridout 2009; Kahn and Kenney 2004).  Thus, 
presidential races theoretically offer the best opportunity to study the content of political fact-
checking. 
The fact-checking landscape has become crowded with many organizations that purport 
to verify the accuracy of political claims.  Besides the dedicated fact-checking organizations such 
as FactCheck.org and PolitiFact.com, many traditional news outlets (both print and electronic) 
offer this type of journalism (such as the Washington Post’s “Fact Checker”) as do partisan 
                                                      
1 One could argue that muckraking and investigative journalists such as Upton Sinclair, I.F. 
Stone, Ida Tarbell, George Seldes etc. were the original fact-checkers. 
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media critics and even the campaigns themselves.  As a form of accountability journalism, 
dedicated fact-checkers are committed to publicizing errors or falsehoods regardless of the 
source.  While partisan bloggers can sometimes offer valuable scrutiny, they generally lack 
credibility among wide audiences because their work is limited to the opposition (Graves and 
Glaisyer 2012).  As observed by the Post’s former Fact Checker, Michael Dobbs (2012: 13), 
when critics fail to take on both sides, “…you are no longer a fact-checker.  You are a tool in a 
political campaign.”  Thus, the viability of fact-checking depends upon it being generally 
accepted as unbiased.  The challenge of this enterprise, however, is its very hallmark:  rendering 
judgment as to whether a claim is factually true.  To do so without drawing criticisms of bias is 
difficult.  Fact-checkers must carefully negotiate which claims to check and how selected claims 
should be evaluated. 
Claim Selection 
Because fact-checkers have limited resources (both in time and labor), not all claims can 
be fact-checked.  Furthermore, not all statements in an ad are factually verifiable.  Therefore, it is 
possible that certain types of political ads may be more likely than others to draw scrutiny.  In 
the political world, the type of advertising that draws the most attention is attack ads.  An 
abundance of both scholarly and mainstream media attention has been given to political 
advertising negativity (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Finkel and Geer 1998; Fowler and 
Ridout 2012; Geer 2000, 2006; Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Jamieson, Waldman and Sherr 
2000; “Political Advertising” 2010; Teinowitz 2008; West 2010).  The consensus is that ad 
negativity is generally on the rise (Benoit 1999; Fowler and Ridout 2012; Geer 2006; Jamieson 
et al. 2000; Kaid and Johnston 2000; West 2010).  In his widely cited book, In Defense of 
Negativity, Geer (2006) tracked the prevalence of negative political ad claims between the 1960 
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and 2004 presidential elections and provided evidence that negativity is, indeed, increasing.  The 
Wesleyan Media Project continues to monitor political advertising, finding that 64% of ads in the 
2012 presidential election were attack ads, up from 51% in 2008 (Fowler and Ridout 2012). 
Negativity in and of itself is not necessarily problematic.  The demobilization hypothesis, 
suggesting that ad negativity suppresses voter turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995) has been 
widely challenged (Jackson, Mondak and Huckfeldt 2009; Jamieson and Cappella 1997; Lau, 
Sigelman and Rovner 2007; Wattenberg and Brians 1999).   Negative ads have actually been 
shown to stimulate knowledge about a campaign (Lau et al. 2007).  Furthermore, negative ads 
are generally more likely to contain supporting evidence for their claims (Geer 2000, 2006; 
Roberts 2013).  However, just because evidence is provided does not mean it is accurate.  
Political advertisers have been shown to misuse source attributions in a way that falsifies the 
information it was intended to support (Roberts 2012). 
Geer’s (2006) defense of negativity rested in part on the assumption that the need for 
evidence in political advertising was a general dynamic of negativity.  Particularly when 
attacking an opponent, argued Geer, candidates had to base their attacks on tangible evidence 
rather than on groundless claims (also see West 2010).  His results demonstrated that attack ads 
were, indeed, supported with more evidence (in the form of documentation) than were 
promotional ads (also see Roberts 2013).  Accordingly, if attack ads are more likely to be based 
upon evidence, one might hypothesize the following: 
H1: Attack ads will draw more scrutiny from fact-checkers than promotional ads.   
Another expected relationship is between the sponsor of an ad and the level of scrutiny it 
may receive.  Geer (2006) found political ads from the out-party candidate to be more negative 
than those from the incumbent, as the party out of power had to be more critical of the 
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controlling party in order to make its case to the public.  This suggests that more evidence-based 
claims will be present in ads from the out party.  Hence,  
H2a: Ads from the out-party candidate will receive more scrutiny from fact-checkers as 
the out party’s attacks will need to be substantiated with evidence. 
Aside from incumbency, whether the source of the ad receives its funding from inside the 
political process (like candidates and parties) versus externally may also affect the likelihood of 
scrutiny from fact-checkers.  As the share of political ad voice shifts away from candidates (Hull 
2007), it is the independent groups that are increasingly on the attack (Fowler 2012).  In 2010, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. FEC effectively gave corporations, unions, 
trade groups and non-profits the ability to spend unlimited amounts of money on uncoordinated 
candidate advertising (Franz 2013; Liptak 2010).  Evidence from the 2008 election indicated that 
these independent groups were more likely to run attack ads than were the candidates (Fowler 
2010).  Moreover, the use of negative ads by independent groups was even more pronounced in 
the 2012 presidential election (Fowler and Ridout 2012).  To the degree that television ad 
inventory remains available, negativity is expected to increase in the foreseeable future (Fowler 
and Ridout 2012). 
Beyond negativity, the rise in independent group ad spending has also raised concern 
because of the perception that these groups have no incentives to be truthful (Brooks and Murov 
2012).  “Groups like ours are potentially very dangerous to the political process,” remarked 
Terry Dolan, Chairman of the National Conservative Political Action Committee.  “A group like 
ours could lie through its teeth and the candidate it helps stays clean” (MacPherson 1980).  
Empirical evidence corroborates Dolan’s speculation.  Among the four top spending 501(c)4 
independent expenditure groups in 2012, 85% of their ad spending was on ads containing at least 
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one deceptive claim (Annenberg 2012).  Furthermore, experimental evidence suggests that 
interest-group ads result in less backlash to the supported candidate (Brooks and Murov 2012) 
just as Dolan contended.  Moreover, interest groups are perceived as more credible than 
candidates.  Even unfamiliar 501(c)4s with ambiguous-sounding names were found to be as 
persuasive as liked, known interest groups and the candidates themselves (Weber, Dunaway and 
Johnson 2012).  Thus, perceived independence and credibility may increase the persuasiveness 
of independent group ad messages, shielding the candidate not only from backlash to negativity, 
but perhaps inaccuracies as well.  With less accuracy, less potential for backlash and greater 
perceived credibility, one would expect these independent ads to be ripe for scrutiny by fact-
checkers.  However, the 2008 presidential election preceded the Citizens United ruling.  On the 
basis that interest group advertising likely was not receiving as much scrutiny as after 2010, one 
would expect to find that:   
H2b: Ads from independent expenditure groups in 2008 will not receive as much 
scrutiny from fact-checkers as will candidate ads. 
Evaluative Consistency 
Once it has been established that a particular ad claim merits scrutiny, rendering 
judgment is an equally perilous task.  To complicate matters, the fact-checkers have differing 
philosophical approaches to evaluating claims.  PolitiFact uses its Truth-O-Meter system to 
facilitate the interpretive process and make fact-checking more accessible to the general public.  
Six categories designate the level of accuracy in a factual statement ranging from “true,” “mostly 
true,” “half true,” “mostly false,” “false,” to “pants on fire,” a ridiculously false statement 
(“About PolitiFact” n.d.).  The Post’s Fact Checker uses a different rating system based upon the 
fictional character Pinocchio, who was prone to lying.  Ads are assigned anywhere from one to 
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four Pinocchios depending upon the degree of inaccuracy.  True statements receive The Geppetto 
Checkmark (Kessler 2011).  Rather than using a ratings system, FactCheck.org simply 
contextualizes statements for readers by identifying what may be potentially misleading 
(Amazeen 2013).  These different methods of evaluating ads make comparisons between the 
fact-checkers a challenge. 
Critics of fact-checking have pointed to a “study” that seems to indicate inconsistencies 
in two of the leading fact-checking organizations (Davis 2012).  Several areas of concern arise 
with this study, entitled “Fact-checkers Disagree on Who Lies Most.”  First, fact-checkers do not 
purport to measure which candidate lies the most as suggested by the title of the study.  Second, 
only a press release announcing the results of the study is available – no formal publication of 
the results exists.  Finally, the press release does not indicate how many of the 152 assessed 
claims were evaluated by both targeted fact-checkers.  As it turns out, the data comparing the 
two organizations included cases in which the fact-checkers evaluated similar but not identical 
claims.  When the omission or addition of just a single word can change the meaning of a claim, 
failure to evaluate identical statements calls into question the validity of this study (Amazeen 
2013).  Nonetheless, the concern over whether political facts can be consistently arbitrated 
remains. 
In politics, what is accepted as fact can be influenced by one’s ideological perceptions of 
the world (Bullock 2006; Kuklinski et al. 1998; Nyhan and Reifler 2010).  Literature on social 
judgment and persuasion also indicate that compatibility or consistency with prior knowledge 
can influence what is accepted as fact (Festinger 1957; Lewandowsky et al. 2012; McGuire 
1972; Wyer 1974).  Moreover, even the type of information an individual is exposed to is 
dependent upon his or her predispositions.  According to this phenomenon of selective exposure, 
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people are more likely to pay attention to information that is consistent with their beliefs and 
avoid counter-attitudinal information (Lord, Ross and Lepper 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006).  
Thus, predispositions can influence not only perceptions of the world but also the world 
individuals choose to expose themselves to.  Indeed, partisan fact-checkers have been shown to 
generally reach like-minded audiences (Graves and Glaisyer 2012).  To be sure, partisanship 
drives credibility for these audiences.  However, the partisan fact-checkers are generally 
unreflective of claims made by their own party (Dobbs 2012; Graves and Glaisyer 2012) thus 
limiting the broad usefulness of their efforts. 
Rather than relying upon “objective” references to the external world as the criterion for 
truth, the consensus theory of truth rests upon acceptance by all competent members of a 
community of discourse (Habermas 1998; Stahl 2006).  From this perspective, the best argument 
among the community of discourse will be the most convincing and lead to consensus on the 
accuracy of a factual claim (Stahl 2006).  Beyond mere consensus, however, the persuasiveness 
of an argument depends upon the perceived credibility and expertise of particular sources.  
Reputable sources will generally be more influential.  Sources perceived as poorly informed, 
untrustworthy or not sharing the same values will generally be less acceptable (Eagly and 
Chaiken 1993; Hovland and Weiss 1951; Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  
FactCheck, PolitiFact and the Fact Checker have risen to the status of “a recognized 
professional cohort in elite journalism” (Graves 2013: 127).  Considerations of newsworthiness, 
fairness, practicality and scientific validity guide all judgments the fact-checkers make in finding 
facts to check (Adair 2011; Graves 2013; Jackson and Jamieson 2007).  As a result of careful 
attention to these details, these fact-checkers have won numerous awards for their work 
including a 2009 Pulitzer Prize earned by PolitiFact for its coverage of the 2008 presidential 
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election (Adair 2009; Graves 2013).  Moreover, they are widely cited by news outlets ranging 
from National Public Radio to FOX News to The Daily Show (Graves 2013).  Indeed, a recent 
study confirms that these self-proclaimed, non-partisan fact-checkers have broader reach in 
public discourse than do partisan fact-checkers.  In particular, the elite fact-checkers draw 
attention from centrist on-line sources as well as relatively equal attention from the left and right 
on the ideological spectrum (Graves and Glaisyer 2012).  Thus, because theories of persuasion 
suggest that the credibility of a source is important, these non-partisan fact-checkers have an 
interest in providing independent reviews that are not driven by ideology or subjectivity.  Based 
upon this logic, one could reasonably make the following prediction:  
H3: Elite fact-checkers will be able to consistently agree on the accuracy of factual 
claims. 
While self-proclamations of political impartiality must stand up to scrutiny (an 
unenviable task beyond the scope of this study), it is also revealing to see whether these “elite” 
fact-checkers offer any consistency when evaluating the same claims.  The credibility of the fact-
checking enterprise would seem to depend upon this uniformity. 
Data and Method 
At the time of his study, Geer (2006) contended that it was too difficult to discriminate 
between political truth and falsehoods.  However, the emergence of the dedicated fact-checking 
organizations since then has offered an opportunity to now address whether political ad accuracy 
is something that can be systematically assessed.  Therefore, for the purposes of this study, ad 
claim accuracy is based upon the evaluations of FactCheck.org, PolitiFact.com and the 
Washington Post’s Fact Checker.  Other organizations such as Spinsanity and newspapers such 
as the New York Times have also conducted fact-checking.  However, Spinsanity disbanded prior 
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to the 2008 election, and the political ad coverage of the Times did not consistently assess the 
accuracy of the ads (Amazeen 2012a).  This analysis focuses specifically on FactCheck.org, 
PolitiFact.com and The Fact Checker because they are enduring fact-checking organizations on a 
national level that continue to operate beyond specific election cycles.  Furthermore, they are 
considered the three elite, national fact-checkers (Graves and Glaisyer 2012).  
Following the method of Geer (2006) and using the accuracy assessments of FactCheck, 
PolitiFact, and The Fact Checker, this study employs a content analysis of televised political ads 
from the 2008 presidential election.  Content analysis has been effectively used by other efforts 
at analyzing political advertising (Brader 2006; Kaid and Johnston 2001; West 2010).  For 
several reasons, this study focuses on the 2008 presidential race, as opposed to congressional or 
gubernatorial races.  First, previous research has indicated that more competitive races generate a 
greater amount of adwatching (Fowler and Ridout 2009; Kahn and Kenny 2004).  The race for 
the highest-elected office in the country generates more publicity and entails more ad spending 
than any other.  Consequently, relative to other races, a larger proportion of ads from a 
presidential race will be available for evaluation by the fact-checkers.  Second, press coverage of 
congressional and gubernatorial races is more localized, reducing the likelihood that a national 
fact-checking organization will have the resources to review many ads from those races.  Third, 
it is also notable that during the presidential election of 2004, FactCheck.org was in its nascent 
year of operation and PolitiFact.com and The Fact Checker did not yet exist, resulting in a very 
small pool of ads that were evaluated.  Thus, for this study evaluation of the ads from 
presidential elections was limited to the 2008 campaign. 
The study examines paid television ads to avoid “press ads” that are generated for the 
sole purpose of news media coverage.  Press ads are often more controversial simply for the sake 
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of drawing media attention (Fowler and Ridout 2009; Ridout and Smith 2008).  Likewise, web 
ads were avoided as these have been shown to be more negative than their television 
counterparts (Roberts 2013).  Furthermore, depending upon the sponsor, political ads that air on 
television may be constrained to some degree by the public interest standards set forth by the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  While candidate ads and party-sponsored ads 
coordinated with candidates cannot be censored even with the presence of false or misleading 
information, independent expenditure ads can be monitored by broadcasters for content.  In fact, 
broadcasters have an obligation to the public to ensure that the content of the ads they air is 
accurate (Amazeen 2012a).  Thus, this analysis limits its scrutiny to the paid television ads from 
the presidential election in 2008. 
This content analysis includes 285 English-language television ads that aired during the 
general election between June 7, 2008 (the date Hillary Clinton conceded the Democratic 
nomination to Obama) and November 4, 2008 (Election Day).  To facilitate coding of all the 
claims, only ads that were sixty seconds in length or shorter were included in this study.  The ads 
were primarily obtained from the online databases of NationalJournal.com, Stanford University’s 
Political Communication Lab, Eric Appleman’s Democracy in Action database hosted by The 
George Washington University, and The New York Times’ Election 2008 ad database.  The ad 
collection was crosschecked with data provided by CMAG to ensure only ads that aired were 
used for this study.  Any ads not in the CMAG data file were deemed not to actually have been 
paid ads that aired and were consequently omitted from this analysis.  
Besides recording the ad sponsor and release date, the research team coded for tone, the 
type of criticism present, the number of specific claims, and whether the claims were supported 
with evidence.  This study adopted the ad tone categorizations offered by Jamieson and 
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colleagues (2000) that have been utilized by Brader (2006) and Geer (2006):  promotional ads 
focus on the candidate’s qualifications, attack ads focus on an opponent’s failings, and contrast 
ads contain comparisons between a candidate’s qualities, record, or proposals and his/her 
opponent’s.  For ads in which an opponent was criticized, the type of criticism was established 
using a five-point scale with strictly policy/issue criticisms anchoring the low end and strictly 
character/personal attacks anchoring the high end of the scale.  The scale’s midpoint was a 
balance between policy and character attacks.  A claim was defined as any statement made in the 
ad regardless of whether its facticity could be established.  Claims were then coded using a 
scheme modified from Geer’s (2006) study (copies of the coding instructions and instrument are 
available upon request from the author).  The use of evidence in an ad included references to 
newspaper articles, televised news reports or other supporting information to seemingly validate 
a claim.  This measure was simply recorded in binary format as either being present or absent.  In 
addition, the number of times each ad aired was recorded based upon figures from the New York 
Times’ Election 2008 ad database (which included records of the actual airing data collected by 
CMAG). 
An initial draft of the coding instrument was informally tested by the author and a 
research assistant.2  Because both nominal and interval level data were evaluated, inter-coder 
reliability was measured using Krippendorff’s alpha.3  Following Jamieson et al. (2000), a 
reliability level of greater than .60 was targeted.  All variables emerged above this inter-coder 
                                                      
2 After a period of training, the coders independently coded six political advertisements from the 
2008 primary election.  Coding problems and disagreements were discussed and the process was 
repeated until it was believed that the instrument achieved reliable coding.  Of the 285 ads in 
total from the general election, fifty were coded by both researchers. 
3 This reliability estimate is adaptable to any level of measurement and number of judges and is 
regarded as a stringently conservative measure of agreement between coders that is not due to 
chance (Hayes and Krippendorff 2007; Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken 2002). 
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reliability standard with most achieving an alpha score in excess of .80 (see Appendix A).4  
Thus, the reliability of coding efforts is sound.   
After collection and coding of the ads, researchers mined the FactCheck, PolitiFact and 
Fact Checker databases to determine which ads were evaluated by any of these fact-checking 
organizations.  The accuracy of each ad claim was recorded using the evaluation designations 
assigned by each fact-checker.  If a claim from a specific ad was not evaluated by the 
organizations, this was also noted.  Krippendorff’s alpha was again calculated to assess the inter-
coder reliability between the three fact checkers.  Since the three fact-checkers used different 
methodologies to assess the accuracy of ad claims, inter-coder reliability was established based 
upon the presence or absence of any inaccuracy in an ad claim.   
Results 
Likelihood of Scrutiny 
Among the 285 ads that aired during the general election, 80 drew scrutiny from the fact-
checkers.  The first hypothesis predicts that attack ads would be more likely to draw scrutiny 
from fact-checkers than promotional ads.  Indeed, Figure 1 illustrates the much greater 
proportion of attack ads (71%) that drew scrutiny from fact-checkers in comparison with 
promotional ads (6%).  This difference is significant (χ2(1) = 18.40, p < .05).  Furthermore, as 
Table 1 indicates, while 59% of all the ads that aired were categorized as attack5, 71% of the 
evaluated ads were considered attack, well above the 54% rate of non-evaluated ads.  This 
difference was significant (z = 2.64, p < .01, two-tailed).  Thus, H1 has been supported. 
                                                      
4 Krippendorff’s alpha was calculated using a macro in SPSS 20.0.0 (Hayes and Krippendorff 
2007). 
5 While the Wesleyan Media Project reported the proportion of attack ads at 51% in 2008 
(Fowler and Ridout 2012), the 59% figure in this study is likely higher because ads longer than 
sixty-seconds were omitted.  These longer ads tended to be promotional. 
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The first hypothesis was based in part on the assumption that negative ads would need to 
have more evidence to substantiate attacks.  Overall, the overwhelming majority of ads (88%) 
included some type of evidence.  As expected, promotional ads were significantly less likely to 
have evidence (76%) than were negative ads of the attack or contrast variety (92%).  This 
difference is significant (χ2(1) = 12.41, p < .05).  Parsing the data further, however, challenges 
expectations.  While most ads (91%) that were evaluated included some sort of evidence, nearly 
as many ads (86%) that did not draw an evaluation also included evidence.  These differences 
were not significant nor were any when examining attack ads in particular.  In other words, the 
mere presence of evidence had little bearing on drawing an evaluation because most ads had 
some minimal amount of evidence.   
Two predictions were made regarding how the source of an ad would relate to drawing an 
evaluation by fact-checkers.  First, H2a predicted that ads from the out-party candidate would 
receive more scrutiny from fact-checkers than other ad sponsors.  There is a significant 
association between the evaluation of an ad and its sponsor (χ2(3) = 16.49, p < .001).  As shown 
in Figure 2, 40% of the ads evaluated by fact-checkers were from Obama, who was in the out 
party.  Only 34% of the evaluated ads were from the McCain campaign, while 21% were from 
interest groups and 5% were party ads.  While the disparity between the proportion of evaluated 
Obama and McCain ads was in the appropriate direction, the magnitude of difference is not 
significant.  However, observing the presence or absence of evidence does lend some support to 
H2a.  As expected from a challenging candidate, a greater proportion of Obama ads (86%) 
contained supporting evidence than did ads from McCain (72%).  This difference is significant 
(χ2(1) = 5.35, p < .05).  So while the challenging candidate was more likely to offer evidence, 
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Obama’s ads were not statistically more likely to draw scrutiny than ads from McCain.  Support 
for H2a must be considered qualified since it did not achieve statistical significance. 
The second source-related prediction (H2b) contrasted the likelihood of scrutiny between 
candidate ads and independent expenditure ads.  As indicated by Table 2, only 21% of the 
evaluated ads were from independent expenditure interest groups.  However, nearly three out of 
four of the evaluated ads (74%) were from either of the candidates.  This difference is significant 
(χ2(1) = 12.58, p < .0001).  Thus, as predicted, ads from independent groups did not receive as 
much scrutiny as did ads from the candidates in 2008.  Interestingly, nearly all the ads from 
independent groups (96%) contained some degree of evidence – a greater proportion than did 
Obama (86%) or McCain (72%) ads. 
Fact-checker Consistency 
A key concern of this study is the degree to which the elite fact-checkers offer consistent 
evaluations.  This section of the analysis first considers which of the same ads were assessed and 
then turns attention to the level of the individual claim.  Among the 80 ads that drew scrutiny, 70 
were evaluated by FactCheck.org, 31 by PolitiFact, and 9 by the Post’s Fact Checker.  Given that 
FactCheck was the most established organization of the three, having begun operations in 2003, 
it is unsurprising that it evaluated claims from more ads than the other operations.  PolitiFact and 
the Fact Checker were both founded in 2007.  Thus, the 2008 presidential election was a first for 
both of them.  Furthermore, the Fact Checker was a one-man operation in 2008, run by Michael 
Dobbs.  Because fact-checking is a time-consuming process (Amazeen 2012a; Graves 2013), 
there are only so many ads one individual can get through in addition to the other fact-checks of 
claims unrelated to political ads. 
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After identifying which of the same ads were evaluated, the individual claims were 
examined for overlap between the fact-checkers as well.  While there was an average of 10 
claims per ad (SD = 4), not every claim drew scrutiny.  Among the 80 ads examined by any of 
the three fact-checkers, 53 different claims were assessed by any two of the three organizations.  
FactCheck.org and PolitiFact scrutinized 36 of the same claims across 18 different ads (see Table 
3).  In these cases, agreement between FactCheck.org and PolitiFact was 98%.  Again, because 
all three of the fact-checkers used different methods to evaluate claim accuracy, agreement is 
based upon the presence or absence (rather than degree) of an inaccuracy.  The quantity of the 
same claims being checked by the Fact Checker and the other organizations was fewer, as shown 
in Table 3.  Nonetheless, the remaining pairings between fact-checkers resulted in total 
agreement (see Figure 3).  When all three fact-checkers evaluated the same six claims, they all 
came to the conclusion that there was an inaccuracy.  Thus, H3 is supported:  Elite fact-checkers 
are able to consistently agree on the accuracy of factual claims.6  (An annotated listing of the 
overlapping claims is in Appendix B.) 
Because FactCheck uses categorical assessments while PolitiFact and the Fact Checker 
use ordinal rating scales, finding correspondence between the different evaluation methods is 
difficult.  Even making comparisons between the two fact-checkers that use ordinal scaling is 
limited due to the small number of cases.  In 2008, there were 8 claims evaluated by both the 
Post’s Fact Checker (which uses a five-point scale) and PolitiFact (using a six-point scale) 
                                                      
6 Despite very high levels of agreement, the relatively modest Krippendorff’s α of 0.66 (see 
Table 3) can be attributed to the constraints imposed by the lack of non-binary data from 
FactCheck.org.  As detailed by Hayes and Krippendorff (2007: 87), the nominal version of α is 
always lower than the obtained α when the observers’ disagreements adhere to the metric of the 
selected α.  For instance, in their example where ordinal data achieved an α of 0.7598, the same 
data treated nominally achieved an α of 0.4765.  Despite this constraint, however, the agreement 
levels in the present study are still acceptable. 
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showing moderate correspondence (r = .66, p < .07, two-tailed).  Cross-tabulations reveal that 6 
out of 10 times, a “false” evaluation by FactCheck drew a “false” or “pants on fire” rating from 
PolitiFact.  FactCheck’s judgment of “distortion/misleading” corresponded most frequently 
(67%) with PolitiFact’s “mostly false” rating (n=21).  PolitiFact rated two claims as 
unequivocally true.  In one case, FactCheck agreed.  In the other case, FactCheck disagreed, 
calling the statement misleading. 
An examination of the disagreement between FactCheck and PolitiFact puts the issue in 
perspective.  While contrasting Senator Obama to Governor Palin, an announcer in the “Alaska 
Maverick” ad claimed that Palin “took on oil producers.”  FactCheck suggested this claim was 
misleading because it disregarded the attempts Obama also had made in taking on oil producers 
(Robertson and Gore 2008).  PolitiFact evaluated this claim as being true.  However, PolitiFact’s 
verdict was not on its landing (web) page for this ad, but rather on a separately linked page 
devoted specifically to “Palin’s efforts to oppose oil companies” (Adair 2008; Lane 2008).  On 
this linked page, PolitiFact offered evidence supportive of the claim about Palin taking on oil 
producers - a claim which originated from Palin’s first speech as McCain’s running mate (Lane 
2008).  Thus, PolitiFact’s “true” designation was removed from the context of the ad.  This may 
explain how the two fact-checking organizations could come to opposing conclusions.  It also 
illustrates the challenges inherent in evaluating a statement removed from its context.  Not only 
must fact-checkers carefully select the claims they scrutinize, they must also consider the context 
in which a claim exists. 
Predicting Evaluations 
It has now been demonstrated that when fact-checkers select the same statements to 
evaluate, they are able to consistently agree on the accuracy of those claims.  However, in order 
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to establish which ad attributes increase the odds that an ad will draw scrutiny from fact-
checkers, a binomial logistic regression model is necessary.  Using a forced entry method, a two-
step model was estimated using six variables measuring ad attributes.  Three were nominal-level 
characteristics: ad sponsor, ad tone, and the presence or absence of supporting evidence.  The 
other three variables were scaled measuring the number of ad claims, the number of times an ad 
aired, and the number of days the ad was released prior to Election Day.  To reduce post-
treatment bias, the first model included only ad tone and ad sponsor as these attributes could 
affect when or how often an ad is shown, the types of claims it makes, evidence used and so 
forth.  The second model includes all the ad attributes.  As shown in Table 4, the significance of 
the original model estimates remain robust with the inclusion of the additional variables (χ2 (9, N 
= 285) = 87.03, p < .001).7 
Holding other variables constant, the tone of ads was the greatest predictor of drawing an 
evaluation (see Table 4).  Consistent with H1, the odds of an ad being scrutinized by a fact-
checker were 23 times higher for attack ads than promotional ads.  Likewise, contrast ads had 
odds 14 times higher than promotional ads.  Ad sponsor also was a significant predictor of 
drawing an evaluation.  Contrary to H2a, it was McCain ads rather than Obama ads that had 
greater odds of being evaluated.  Consistent with H2b, however, both of the candidates’ ads were 
more likely to have been evaluated than were interest group ads.  Another significant predictor of 
evaluation was the release date of an ad.  Ads that were released early on in the election had a 
greater likelihood of drawing an evaluation than did ads that were released near the end.  While 
the number of times an ad aired was indicated as a predictor, its contribution in the model was 
not meaningful.  It is also noteworthy that neither the number of claims in an ad nor the presence 
                                                      
7 Results were similar using OLS, F(3, 285) = 10.43, p < .001. 
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of any sort of supporting evidence were found as contributing factors in predicting whether an ad 
drew an evaluation from fact-checkers. 
Discussion 
The primary take-away from this research is that political marketers, reporters and voters 
can be comfortable that evaluations of the leading fact-checkers are consistent.  This study 
demonstrates that the elite fact-checkers were overwhelmingly in agreement about the presence 
of political ad claim inaccuracies in 2008.  Because of the differing methods used by the fact-
checking organizations to assess the claims, however, the analysis in this study was limited to 
binary agreement.  Nonetheless, despite the differing philosophies about whether the degree of 
accuracy can be measured, the elite fact-checkers do exhibit consistency in determining whether 
a fundamental inaccuracy is present.  Convergence around evidence using different approaches 
lends credibility to this analysis (Jackson and Jamieson 2007).   
An important question is why we should even care whether the predominating fact-
checking organizations are consistent or not.  In theory, we would expect that the public would 
find fact-checkers more credible if their assessments about the accuracy of a statement were 
similar.  If not one, not two, but all three independent fact-checkers conclude that a particular 
political claim is misleading, Jane Q. Citizen will likely feel more confident that she is not 
getting a straight story from the politician and therefore needs more information.  Particularly 
when these fact-checking organizations claim to be non-partisan and can consistently monitor the 
statements of public officials from all points on the ideological spectrum, the reputation of the 
whole enterprise of fact-checking may be enhanced.  Experimental evidence shows that media 
which offer fact-checking reporting are perceived by the public as more trustworthy than those 
that offer the “he-said, she-said” style of reporting (Thorson 2013).  It would seem that an 
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important attribute of fact-checking is the ability to consistently check facts regardless of 
ideology.  Furthermore, we know that citizens who seek out fact-checking are better informed 
than those who do not (Annenberg 2012b).  Thus, providing fact-checking journalism may not 
only create more trust in media, but a better informed electorate as well. 
Fact-checking consistency also has implications for the behavior of political actors.  
When a framework of fact-checking becomes established, it should become more difficult for a 
politician to fabricate claims.  For example, in 2008, McCain’s “Education” ad was criticized by 
all the fact-checkers for inaccurately claiming that Obama’s one accomplishment for education 
was legislating comprehensive sex education for Kindergarteners.  The ad was pulled soon after 
the criticism.  More recently, at the end of the 2012 presidential election, candidate Mitt Romney 
faced an impenetrable wall of fact-checkers.  His claim that Jeep was moving its U.S. 
manufacturing to China was widely condemned and may have cost him the election (Amazeen 
2013).  More generally, a field study has demonstrated that the threat of fact-checking reduces 
the likelihood that legislators will make inaccurate statements (Nyhan and Reifler 2013).  
Furthermore, evidence suggests that politicians suffer reputational damage when shown by fact-
checkers to be making false accusations (Thorson 2013).  Thus, fact-checking has the potential to 
improve political behavior.  With improved political behavior, more qualified candidates who 
previously may not have considered running may enter the political process.  This would be a 
win for democracy.  But this is only possible with consistent fact-checking. 
For journalism, the consistency of fact-checking is encouraging in that the evaluations of 
the leading fact-checkers are increasingly being used by journalists in their own reporting.  
While PolitiFact and the Post’s Fact Checker rely upon a direct exposure model for getting their 
information to the public, FactCheck.org was premised upon a journalistic diffusion model.  As 
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co-founder Kathleen Hall Jamieson has explained, when FactCheck was launched in 2003, 
internet diffusion into mainstream journalism did not exist the way it does today.  They did not 
think they would be able to directly reach the public and therefore encouraged journalists to 
“Please Steal Our Stuff” (Amazeen 2013).  As cutbacks continue to reduce the staffing and 
resources in America’s newsrooms (McChesney and Pickard 2011), the remaining journalists 
can look to FactCheck, PolitiFact and the Post’s Fact Checker as consistent resources to do the 
time-consuming task of fact-checking that they, themselves, may not be able to do. 
The relevancy of consistent, credible fact-checking can also be considered more broadly, 
particularly as political TV ads increasingly drown out other potential sources of information for 
the public (Nichols and McChesney 2013; West 2010).  In 2012, for instance, the stupefying 
quantity of political advertising actually resulted in some broadcast news stations cutting back on 
the duration of their newscasts in order to allow for airing more political advertising inventory.  
Furthermore, in a post-Citizens United world, political TV advertising is coming to define 
downballot races and even local initiatives, referendums and judicial races (Nichols and 
McChesney 2013).  Thus, with the revelation that fact-checking can be consistently practiced, 
localized efforts at fact-checking need encouragement.  While the elite fact-checkers do not have 
the resources to scrutinize claims from local elections, they can serve as models for best practices 
in fact-checking. 
These results also offer guidance about which types of ads are most likely to draw 
scrutiny from fact-checkers.  First, attack ads had the highest odds of drawing an evaluation.  
This aligns with other studies showing ad negativity drives news coverage (Fowler and Ridout 
2009; McKinnon et al. 1996; Ridout and Smith 2008).  Based upon the economic theory of the 
marketplace, news producers are more likely to offer coverage of topics that attract public 
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attention as exemplified in the “if it bleeds, it leads” mantra (Gans 1979; Hamilton 2004).  In 
contrast, promotional ads were least likely to draw an evaluation from fact-checkers.  As 
observed by FactCheck’s Brooks Jackson, “We find often little to criticize in the puffy, airy-
fairy, biographical ads that show the candidate with his or her spouse and an Irish Setter and 
lovely children and a coat slung over their shoulder saying what a great resume they’ve got…” 
(personal communication, November 11, 2009).  These results seem to support Jackson’s 
remarks and may be instructive for journalists wishing to initiate fact-checking efforts at their 
own news organization. 
The supporting logic behind the theory that ad negativity would draw more scrutiny was 
that attacks require more evidence (Geer 2006).  However, in this study, the mere presence of 
evidence had little bearing on drawing an evaluation as demonstrated by the lack of support for 
H2a and the support for H2b.  Out-party ads did not draw more scrutiny as anticipated nor did 
independent expenditure ads despite being more likely to contain evidence.  It may be that the 
measure used to assess evidence was not discriminating enough.8  After all, only the presence or 
absence of any type of supporting evidence was measured which could have simply included a 
candidate’s own website.  Most ads in this study had some minimal amount of evidence.  
Furthermore, the facticity of a claim can be assessed by fact-checkers whether or not it is sourced 
in an ad.  The fact-checkers contend that the responsibility is incumbent on political advertisers 
to prove a claim is true:  “People who make factual claims are accountable for their words and 
should be able to provide evidence to back them up. We will try to verify their statements, but 
we believe the burden of proof is on the person making the statement” (Adair 2011).  Yet, as 
                                                      
8 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, another plausible explanation may be that despite Obama 
being the challenger, McCain was from the incumbent party running under conditions that made 
Obama the favorite and forcing McCain to be quite negative as well. 
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Roberts (2013) has demonstrated, even sourced evidence in political ads can be misused.  Rather 
than evidence, what may be more critical in drawing evaluations from fact-checkers is the 
verifiability of a claim.  Indeed, the first item on PolitiFact’s guidelines for selecting claims to 
check is whether a statement is rooted in a fact that is verifiable (Adair 2011). 
The implication of this finding is not to suggest that political marketers limit their 
creative efforts to promotional ads because they are less likely to draw scrutiny from fact-
checkers or to create ads that are devoid of checkable facts.  Electoral politics generally requires 
high-involvement decision-making; therefore, voters need details about the candidates.  Geer’s 
defense of negativity on the basis of providing more information to voters has merit.  That 
information, however, needs to be accurate.  While advertisers are granted some poetic license in 
selling their products, the impressions they create need to have some relation to reality 
particularly when they address the state of the economy or the effects of policy decisions.  
A final observation about the types of ads expected to draw scrutiny from fact-checkers is 
likely a construct of the 2008 election.  As hypothesized, candidate ads were more likely to draw 
scrutiny than were independent expenditure ads.  However, given the Citizens United ruling and 
the ensuing media attention to interest group advertising, it is likely that future elections will 
show increasing fact-checker attention on independent expenditure groups. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Some limitations of this study need consideration.  First, a more discriminating measure 
of evidence is needed in order to gauge the relationship between fact-checking, inaccuracies, and 
the use of sources.  While these findings suggest no relationship between the presence of 
generalized evidence in an ad and the likelihood that the ad will draw a fact-checker evaluation, 
it may be useful to know the types of evidence that do draw attention.  For instance, Roberts 
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(2013) found that nearly half of the newspaper citations used in political ads from 2008 were 
based upon opinions rather than reporting.  This is a distinction viewers are unlikely to make but 
one that may theoretically draw an inaccurate rating from fact-checkers.  Other mis-uses of 
evidence have included cherry-picking portions of news articles that favor a position while 
ignoring inconvenient aspects from the news source, mis-appropriating the source of information 
contained in a news article, or inventing headlines that did not appear with an original news story 
(Roberts 2012).  These are distinctions emerging fact-checkers need to consider.  Furthermore, 
political marketers must be careful in deciding how supporting evidence is used in ads because 
fact-checkers are verifying these details.  Going forward, a more precise measurement of 
evidence would contribute to understanding of this issue. 
Second, fact-checkers do not seek out accurate statements (Graves 2013).  Their primary 
goal is to inform the public of inaccuracies (Amazeen 2013; Graves 2013; Graves and Glaisyer 
2012).  Because fact-checkers do not evaluate the accuracy of every statement in an ad, one 
cannot calculate “who lies more” or the overall inaccuracy rate of political advertising.  This 
point is emphasized in order to bring clarity to how these data on fact-checking can and cannot 
be generalized. 
Third, while the fact-checkers may be consistent in determining whether a fundamental 
inaccuracy is present, this study does not consider the effectiveness of the varying methods fact-
checkers employ to inform the public.  As fact-checking has evolved and grown over the last 
twenty years, studies have shown inconclusive evidence about the effectiveness of correcting 
public misinformation (Annenberg 2012b; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; Cappella and 
Jamieson 1994; Iyengar and Simon 2000; O’Sullivan and Geiger 1995; Thorson 2013).  Some 
have even found backfire effects whereby people retain the message of the ad rather than the 
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correction provided in the fact-check (Just et al. 1996; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pfau and Louden 
1994).  More research is needed to determine the type of fact-checking format that most 
effectively informs citizens. 
Finally, this study is limited to a single presidential election.  Going forward, trend 
analyses would be useful between elections across time.  As fact-checking continues to 
proliferate down to state and local levels, more opportunities should arise to study this enterprise 
beyond presidential elections. 
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Table 1 Number and Percentage of Evaluated Ads by Ad Tone 
 Attack Contrast Promotional 
 # % # % # % 
Not Evaluated (n=205)a 111 54 29 14 65 32 
Evaluated (n=80)a   57 71 18 23   5   6 
Total (N=285) 168 59 47 17 70 25 
 
an is total ads in a row. 
χ2(2, N = 285) = 20.474, p < .001, Φ Cramer’s V = .268. 
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Table 2 Number and Percentage of Evaluated Ads by Ad Sponsor 
 Obama McCain Interest Group Party 
 # % # % # % # % 
Not Evaluated (n=205)a   71 35 33 16   88 43 13 6 
Evaluated (n=80)a   32 40 27 34   17 21   4 5 
Total (N=285) 103 36 60 21 105 37 17 6 
 
an is total ads in a row. 
χ2(3, N = 285) = 16.488, p < .001, Φ Cramer’s V = .241. 
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Table 3 Fact-Checker Agreement (among elite fact-checkers) 
Fact-checker Ads Claims Agreement 
 # # % 
FactCheck.org and 
PolitiFact 
18 36 98 
FactCheck.org and the 
Fact Checker 
5 9 100 
Fact Checker and 
PolitiFact.com 
1 2 100 
FactCheck.org, the 
Fact Checker, and 
PolitiFact.com 
2 6 100 
 
Agreement is based upon the presence or absence of an inaccuracy.  Krippendorff’s α = 0.66 
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Table 4  Predicting Ad Evaluations 
       
  Model 1  Model 2 
  B  Exp(B)  B  Exp(B) 
 Promote  
 
***    ***  
Ad tone Attack 2.53 
(0.52) 
*** 12.49  3.15 
(0.63) 
*** 23.35 
 Contrast 2.23 
(0.57) 
*** 9.33  2.67 
(0.68) 
*** 14.40 
         
 Interest Group 
 
 ***    **  
Ad McCain 1.98 
(0.41) 
*** 7.23  1.65 
(0.47) 
*** 5.22 
Sponsor Obama 1.42 
(0.37) 
*** 4.14  1.13 
(0.42) 
** 3.08 
 Party 0.54 
(0.64) 
 1.72  0.46 
(0.71) 
 1.58 
         
 Ad Release Date     0.02 
(0.01) 
*** 1.02 
 # Ad Airings     0.00 
(0.00) 
* 1.00 
 # Ad Claims     0.03 
(0.04) 
 1.03 
 Evidence     0.87 
(0.55) 
 2.39 
 Constant -4.02 
(0.57) 
   -6.70 
(1.05) 
  
         
Cox & Snell R2  0.17    0.26  
Nagelkerke R2  0.25    0.38  
χ2   53.57    87.03  
N   285    285  
 
Note:  Estimation by binary logistic regression.  Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05.  **p < 
.01.  ***p < .001.  Base reference categories are bolded. 
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Figure 1  Evaluation Status of Ads by Ad Tone 
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Figure 2  Evaluation Status of Ads by Ad Sponsor 
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Figure 3  2008 Fact-checker Agreement 
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APPENDIX A 
Inter-coder Reliability Testing 
 
Fifty ads were randomly selected and checked for reliability between coders.  Because both 
nominal and interval level data were evaluated, inter-coder reliability was measured using 
Krippendorff’s alpha.  This reliability estimate is adaptable to any level of measurement and 
number of judges and is regarded as a stringently conservative measure of agreement between 
coders that is not due to chance (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007; Lombard, Snyder-Duch & 
Bracken, 2002).  The Krippendorff’s alpha reliability rating for each measure is listed below. 
 
In addition to calculating how many claims were in each ad, coders had to agree on which 
statements should be considered a claim.  Accordingly, claim numbers refer to the position in the 
ad script where each claim appeared. Claim 1, for instance, indicates the alpha between coders 
was .946.  Coders were highly consistent at selecting which statement was the first claim in an 
ad.  Reliability declines with the number of claims in an ad as some material that does not meet 
the criteria for a claim (such as “Are you voting on Election Day?”) must be overlooked.  On 
average, each ad had 10 claims.
 
Number of Ad claims = .946 
claim 1 = .959 
claim 2 = .876 
claim 3 = .897 
claim 4 = .790 
claim 5 = .874 
claim 6 = .828 
claim 7 = .789 
claim 8 = .823 
claim 9 = .732 
claim 10 = .800 
 
claim 11 = .757 
claim 12 = .743 
claim 13 = .840 
claim 14 = .694 
claim 15 = 1.00 
claim 16 = 1.00 
claim 17 = 1.00 
claim 18 = 1.00 
Ad Tone = .818 
Ad Criticism Type = .860 
Supporting source citation = .61
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APPENDIX B 
Ad Evaluation Comparisons by Fact-checker 
Ad Name (Sponsor-Release Date) 
FactCheck.org  
Rating 
PolitiFact 
Rating 
WP  
Fact Checker 
Rating 
Advice (McCain-9/20/08) 
   Claim: Franklin Raines advises Obama 
on mortgage and housing policies 
Distortion/Misleading - 2 Pinocchios 
Alaska Maverick (McCain-9/3/08) 
   Claim: He's the Senate's "most liberal." Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Claim: She "took on oil producers." Distortion/Misleading True - 
Ambition (McCain-10/10/08)    
Claim: Obama worked w/William Ayers Distortion/Misleading - 2 Pinocchios 
Claim: Obama lied about working 
w/Ayers 
False - 2 Pinocchios 
Celebrity (McCain-7/30/08)    
Claim: And [Obama] says he'll raise taxes 
on electricity. 
False Mostly False - 
Country I Love (Obama-6/19/08)     
Claim: That's why I passed laws moving 
people from welfare to work... 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly True - 
Claim: …cut taxes for working families... Distortion/Misleading Mostly True - 
Claim: ...extended healthcare for 
wounded troops who'd been neglected. 
Distortion/Misleading Half True - 
Education (McCain-9/7/08)    
Claim: Education Week says Obama 
"hasn't made a significant mark on 
education." 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False 3 Pinocchios 
Claim:  That he's "elusive" on 
accountability. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False 3 Pinocchios 
Claim: A "staunch defender of the 
existing public school monopoly." 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False 3 Pinocchios 
Claim: Obama's one accomplishment? False Pants on Fire 3 Pinocchios 
Claim: Legislation to teach 
"comprehensive sex education" ... to 
kindergartners. 
False Pants on Fire 3 Pinocchios 
Embrace (Obama-8/13/08)    
Claim: Billions in tax breaks for oil... Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Claim: …and drug companies. Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Fact Check (McCain-9/10/08)    
Claim: The attacks on Governor Palin 
have been called "completely false" 
Distortion/Misleading - 3 Pinocchios 
Claim: ..."misleading." Distortion/Misleading - 3 Pinocchios 
Claim: The Journal reports Obama 
"airdropped a mini-army of 30 lawyers, 
investigators and opposition 
researchers" into Alaska to dig dirt on 
Governor Palin. 
Distortion/Misleading - 3 Pinocchios 
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Ad Name (Sponsor-Release Date) 
FactCheck  
Rating 
PolitiFact 
Rating 
WP  
Fact Checker 
Rating 
Gianna (BornAliveTruth.org-9/15/08)    
Claim: But if Barack Obama had his way, 
I wouldn't be here. 
False False - 
Golden Years (Obama-10/16/08)    
Claim: [McCain's] healthcare plan would 
cut Medicare by $800 billion. 
False - 3 Pinocchios 
Claim: That means a 22% cut in 
benefits… 
False - 3 Pinocchios 
Heartless (Planned Parenthood-10/2/08)    
Claim: Text on screen: [McCain] Voted to 
let governments charge rape victims. 
Distortion/Misleading Pants on Fire - 
Iran/Tiny (McCain-8/26/08)    
Claim: Obama says Iran is a "tiny" 
country... 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Claim: ..."doesn't pose a serious threat". Distortion/Misleading False - 
McCain Birth Control/Pause (Planned 
Parenthood Action Fund-7/16/08)    
Claim: ...it's unfair that insurance 
companies cover Viagra but not birth 
control. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Obama Wants Social Security for Illegals 
(Republican National Trust-10/26/08)    
Claim: Barack Obama’s plan gives a 
driver’s license to any illegal who wants 
one. 
False Mostly False - 
Original Mavericks (McCain-9/7/08)    
Claim: She [Palin] stopped the Bridge to 
Nowhere. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False 3 Pinocchios 
Painful (McCain-8/8/08)    
Claim: Obama voted to raise taxes on 
people making just $42,000. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Claim: Text on screen: Obama: Raise 
taxes on middle class. 
False Mostly False - 
Claim: He promises more taxes on small 
business... 
Misrepresentation Mostly False - 
Claim: ...seniors… Misrepresentation Mostly False - 
Claim: …your life savings... Misrepresentation Mostly False - 
Claim: …your family. Misrepresentation Mostly False - 
Pocket (Obama-8/4/08)    
Claim: Now, Big Oil's filling John 
McCain's campaign with $2 million in 
contributions... 
False Mostly True - 
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Ad Name (Sponsor-Release Date) 
FactCheck  
Rating 
PolitiFact 
Rating 
WP  
Fact Checker 
Rating 
Protect Infants (Obama-9/17/08)    
Claim: John McCain's attacks? One of the 
sleaziest ads ever… 
Misrepresentation False - 
Claim: …truly vile. Misrepresentation False - 
Claim: He's running on a platform to ban 
abortion…even in cases of rape… 
False False - 
Claim: …and incest. False False - 
Pump (McCain-7/21/08)    
Claim: Who can you thank for rising 
prices at the pump?  Obama! Obama! 
False False - 
Rearview Mirror (Obama-11/2/08)    
Claim: As president [McCain 
would]...keep tax breaks for companies 
that ship our jobs overseas. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Claim: He wants $4 billion dollars in new 
tax breaks for big oil. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Claim: And would tax your health care 
benefits for the first time ever. 
Distortion/Misleading Half True - 
Rein (McCain-10/1/08)    
Claim: But Democrats blocked the 
reforms. 
Distortion/Misleading Half True - 
Social Security/Promise (Obama-9/16/08)    
Claim: Cutting benefits in half. False - 3 Pinocchios 
Tax Healthcare/Prescription (Obama-
10/1/08)    
Claim: And that tax credit? McCain's own 
website says it goes straight to the 
insurance companies, not to you. 
True True - 
Claim: Leaving you on your own to pay 
McCain's health insurance tax. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Troop Funding (McCain-7/18/08)    
Claim: Barack Obama never held a single 
Senate hearing on Afghanistan. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly True - 
Claim: He hasn't been to Iraq in years. Distortion/Misleading Mostly True - 
Claim: He voted against funding our 
troops. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly True - 
Troops (McCain-7/26/08)    
Claim: Seems the Pentagon wouldn't 
allow him to bring cameras. 
Distortion/Misleading Mostly False - 
Worse (RNC-9/30/08)    
Claim: Under Barack Obama's plan the 
government would spend a trillion 
dollars more… 
- Half True 2 Pinocchios 
Claim: A trillion dollars! - Half True 2 Pinocchios 
 
